Variables and Attitudes by Pickel, Bryan
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables and Attitudes
Citation for published version:
Pickel, B 2015, 'Variables and Attitudes' Nous, vol. 49, no. 2, pp. 333-356. DOI: 10.1111/nous.12044
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1111/nous.12044
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Published In:
Nous
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Pickel, B. (2013). Variables and Attitudes. Nous, n/a(n/a), n/a-n/a.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
VARIABLES AND ATTITUDES
BRYAN PICKEL
Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract. The phenomenon of quantification into attitude ascriptions has
haunted broadly Fregean views, according to which co-referential proper names
are not always substitutable salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. Opponents
of Fregeanism argue that a belief ascription containing a proper name such
as ‘Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable’ is equivalent to a quantified
sentence such as ‘there is someone such that Michael believes that she is
charitable, and that person is Lindsay’. They conclude that the semantic
contribution of a name such as ‘Lindsay’ is the same as the semantic con-
tribution of a variable under an assignment, which these opponents suggest
is merely the object assigned to that variable. However, renewed interest in
variables suggests that they make a more complicated contribution to the se-
mantic processing of sentences that contain them. In particular, a variable
contributes both an assignment-unsaturated and an assignment-saturated se-
mantic value. I use this dual role of the semantics of variables to develop a
response to the argument from quantifying in. I take as my point of departure
Cumming’s (2008) view that an attitude ascription relates the subject of an
attitude to the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. I
argue that this approach fails. I propose an alternative, according to which the
truth of a belief ascription depends on both the assignment-saturated and the
assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence. This approach
reverses standard assumptions concerning the relation between quantification
and substitution.
Millianism is the view that names and other singular terms such as indexicals
and demonstratives are directly referential, contributing nothing more than their
referents as inputs to the semantic processing of sentences that contain them. This
entails that sentences differing only by the substitution of co-referential proper
names are synonymous. Many take this to be a strike against Millianism, since there
are contexts in which the substitution salva veritate of co-referntial proper names
looks implausible. The worry is most pressing in the case of attitude ascriptions. For
instance, even if ‘Lindsay’ and ‘Nellie’ refer to the same individual in the relevant
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context, it is tempting to suppose that (1) and (2) may differ in truth-value at a
time when Michael is ignorant of the fact that Lindsay has two names.
(1) Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable.
(2) Michael believes that Nellie is charitable.
Yet, Millianism entails that (1) and (2) have the same semantic content and thus
agree in truth-value.1
Anyone who rejects this Millian conclusion must respond to an argument devel-
oped by Quine (1976a) and Kaplan (1989) and more recently articulated by Salmon
(1986: 1-9, §9.2) and Soames (2010: §1.16) for the claim that a referential inter-
pretation of names best explains the phenomenon of quantification into modal and
epistemic contexts. I will focus on epistemic contexts, since the rigidity of proper
names under modal operators is largely a settled matter. Millians suggest that (1)
entails (3) and its typical regimentation (3a).
(3) There is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and
that person is Lindsay.
(3a) There is an x such that x=Lindsay and Michael believes that x is
charitable.
In these sentences, the name ‘Lindsay’ occurs outside of the scope of the belief
ascription. Inside the scope of the belief ascription is an anaphoric pronoun ‘she’
in (3) and a variable x in (3a).2 The semantics of anaphoric pronouns are often
assimilated to the semantics of variables, so I will focus on (3a). Sentence (3a)
is true just in case there is an assignment function σ that assigns the variable x
to Lindsay and the embedded sentence ‘Michael believes that x is charitable’ is
satisfied by σ. According to the Millian, this embedded sentence is satisfied by σ
provided that Michael stands in the believing relation to the semantic content of the
sentence ‘x is charitable’ relative to σ. Millians argue that – relative to assignment
σ – the variable x contributes nothing more than its value, Lindsay, to the semantic
1Of course, some Millians posit additional structure in the attitude ascription to block these
results. See Crimmins and Perry (1989).
2I omit quotes for expressions containing only formalism. I also will frequently use simple quotation
for corner quotes.
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processing of sentences that contain it. As Kaplan (1989: 484) says, “free variables
under an assignment of values are the paradigms of [...] directly referential terms.
In determining a semantic value for a formula containing a free variable we may
be given a value for the variable [...] but nothing more.” Since (1) entails (3a),
the singular term, ‘Lindsay’, must contribute at least its referent to the semantic
processing of (1). Millians suggest that it overly complicates the semantics if the
name contributes more than the variable. They conclude that the name contributes
its referent and nothing more to the semantic processing of the belief ascription.
The orthodox reaction to this argument proposes that a name contributes more
than an anaphoric pronoun or variable does to the semantic value of sentences
that contain it. Attitude ascriptions whose embedded clauses contain variables or
anaphoric pronouns in place of names are then construed as incomplete specifica-
tions of the attitudes they ascribe using a trick for “quantifying in” learned from
Kaplan (1968).
However, renewed interest in the semantics of variables holds the promise of an
alternative reaction to the Millian’s argument. In particular, it has been observed
that in addition to its semantic value relative to an assignment a variable also has
an assignment-unsaturated semantic value. A variable x designates different in-
dividuals relative to different assignment functions. This assignment-unsaturated
semantic value enters into the compositional processing of sentences containing
bound variables. For instance, the truth or falsity of ∀xΦ(x) relative to an assign-
ment σ depends on whether Φ(x) is true or false relative to every x-variant of σ. In
a sense, variables contribute two semantic values to sentences that contain them:
(i) the value of the variable relative to whatever assignment function the sentence
takes as input and (ii) the potential to designate different individuals relative to
different assignment functions. It has recently been popular to appeal to these two
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aspects of a variable to try to account for the semantics of proper names and other
singular terms.3
In this paper, I develop a response to the problem of quantifying in that makes no
use of Kaplan’s machinery. I take as my point of departure Sam Cumming’s (2008)
attempt to use these two aspects of the semantics of variables in order to develop a
semantics for attitude ascriptions. Very roughly, Cumming’s proposal says that an
attitude ascription relates the subject of the attitude to the assignment-unsaturated
semantic value of an open sentence, rather than its assignment-saturated semantic
value. The semantic content of a proper name such as ‘Lindsay’ or ‘Nellie’ can then
be identified with the content of a variable without identifying the contents of (1)
and (2). But – as I show – Cumming’s approach fails: whether ‘S believes that Φ’ is
satisfied by assignment σ depends, in part, on the interpretation of Φ under σ. Oth-
erwise, the truth of the belief ascription loses its connection to the truth conditions
of the belief ascribed. Instead, I argue that the truth-value of an attitude ascription
depends on both the assignment-saturated and the assignment-unsaturated seman-
tic value of the sentence embedded in the that-clause. It will turn out that belief
is a relation to what I will call a quasi-open proposition. This approach reverses
standard assumptions concerning the relation between quantification and substi-
tution. If I am correct, then the fact that Michael believes of Lindsay that she is
charitable does not entail that he believes of someone who happens to be identical
to her (namely, Nellie) that she is charitable.
1. The Semantics of Variables
According to the standard semantics for first-order logic since Tarski, sentences
are not true or false simpliciter. Rather, they are satisfied or not by functions that
assign values to all free variables.4 This assignment sensitivity also plays a role in
3Most contemporary philosophers who identify the contribution of some class of singular terms
with that of free variables trace elements of their view to Heim (1982) and Kamp (2002). Some-
times appeal is made to dynamic semantics developed in Groenendijk and Stokhof (1991). Dever
(1998) defends a different version of the thesis that names are free variables.
4Tarski (1983a: 189-191) reasoned from the fact that the quantifiers ∃x and ∀x attach to syntactic
objects of the same kind as standard truth-functional sentential operators such as negation ¬ and
disjunction ∨. For this reason, Tarski argued that – even for the purposes of extensional semantics
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natural language semantics.5 However, I focus on the narrow language of first-order
modal logic with a belief operator. The language includes the following expressions
and sentences.
Terms: A countable set of variables, x1, x2,...
Predicates: A countable set of n-ary predicates, R1n, R
2
n,...
Sentences: If t1,...,tn are n terms andRn is an n-ary predicate, thenRnt1 . . . tn
and t1 = tn are sentences. If Φ and Ψ are sentences and t is a term, then
Φ ∨Ψ, ¬Φ, ∀xΦ, ∃xΦ, Φ, ♦Φ, and BtΦ are sentences.
I will briefly sketch a standard semantics to fix ideas. The semantics of the belief
operator BtΦ will be left for later.
Let model M =< D,W, I > have domain D, set of worlds W , and interpretation
function I. In the following semantic clauses, a variable contributes its assignment-
saturated value to the semantic value of sentences that contain it.6
Terms: ||t||σ,w,M = σ(t)
Predicates: ||Rn||M = I(Rn), which is a function from worlds drawn from
W onto n-tuples of individuals drawn from the domain D.
Formulas: σ,w,M Rnt1, ..., tn iff < ||t1||σ,w,M , ..., ||tn||σ,w,M > ∈ ||Rn||M (w)
=: σ,w,M t1 = tn iff ||t1||σ,w,M = ||tn||σ,w,M
∨: σ,w,M Φ ∨Ψ iff σ,w,M Φ or σ,w,M Ψ
¬: σ,w,M ¬Φ iff 2σ,w,M Φ
: σ,w,M Φ iff for every w∗ ∈W , σ,w∗,M Φ
♦: σ,w,M ♦Φ iff for some w∗ ∈W , σ,w∗,M Φ
Other operators such as conjunction & and the conditional⇒ can be defined in the
standard way.7
– the semantic value of a sentence cannot be its truth-value. In particular, the truth-value of a
quantified claim ∀xΦ(x) depends on the truth-value of Φ(x) relative to every possible value of
x. Since quantifiers may attach to sentences containing an arbitrary number of variables, Tarski
concluded that a sentence can only be true or false relative to an assignment (or a sequence) that
assigns a value to every variable.
5This role is sometimes disguised by the fact that each quantifier’s dual roles of variable binding
and generalization are divided between quantifiers proper and λ-abstraction operators. See Heim
and Kratzer (1998: §§5.2.2-5.2.3). A nice discussion can be found in Rabern (2012).
6Since this paper does not concern modality, I am using rather unsophisticated characterizations
of the modal operators.
7If one prefers a semantic theory that assigns a single semantic value to all entities rather than
semantic values relative to an assignment function, one could also characterize the fixed meaning
of a variable by the axiom ||t||M,w = λσ(σ(t)). The details don’t matter for my discussion. See
Lewis (1998a).
6 VARIABLES AND ATTITUDES
The fact that a variable has an assignment-unsaturated meaning emerges in
the case of variable binding operators, specifically quantifiers. Let σ[x/d] be the
assignment function that agrees with σ for all values, except possibly x, which is
mapped to object d. Then the quantifiers can be characterized as follows.
∃: σ,w,M ∃xΦ iff for some d ∈ D, σ[x/d],w,M Φ
∀: σ,w,M ∀xΦ iff for every d ∈ D, σ[x/d],w,M Φ
A universal claim such as ∀xΦ(x) is satisfied by a sequence σ just in case the
embedded sentence Φ(x) is satisfied by every x-variant of σ. On the other hand,
an existential claim such as ∃xΦ(x) is satisfied by a sequence σ just in case the
embedded sentence Φ(x) is satisfied by some x-variant of σ. In this sense, quantifiers
have the effect of shifting the assignment functions relative to which an embedded
sentence is to be evaluated. The truth-value of a quantified claim depends on the
assignment-unsaturated semantic value, its ability to designate different individuals
relative to different assignments.
2. Variables and Other Singular Terms
Renewed appreciation for this dual life of variables has led some to regiment
names and other singular terms as variables and yet deny that their position has
the unwelcome consequences of Millianism. I focus on names. On this view, (4)
can be regimented as (4a).
(4) Nellie was adopted.
(4a) Axn
There are a number of complications that arise from such a regimentation. The
most pressing challenge arises from the fact that (4a) is an open sentence and unlike
a closed sentence whose truth-value is fixed by the world of evaluation, has different
truth-values relative to different assignment functions. It is therefore unclear how
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to assess the utterance of a sentence like (4a) for correctness. What supplies the
missing parameter?8
One approach appeals to the fact that utterances such as (4) always occur as
parts of larger discourses such as (5) and its regimentation (5a).
(5) Nellie was Michael’s sister. Nellie was adopted.
(5a) Sxn, Axn
On this approach, the multiple sentences are collected into a single representation
which has existential truth conditions such as ∃xn(Sxn&Axn). This seems to be
Cumming’s (2008: §2.3) approach to cases of what he calls bound names. Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT) deploys a similar treatment for all names
using a construction algorithm to generate a representation that has existential
truth conditions.9
Another approach – preferred by Cumming (2008: §3.1) for “free occurrences” of
names – says that the assignment function is provided by context.10 On this view,
the assignment function is an index supplied by the context as part of the semantic
processing of the sentence. A more radical view along these lines is developed by
Dever (1998: §2.3.2.2, §2.3.2.4) who suggests that the relevant assignment function
is not required for semantic processing, but results from the genuinely post-semantic
process of determining speaker meaning.11
8I note, following Dever (1998: §2.3.2.4.3.1) and Cumming (2008: §3.3), that variables are rigid
designators on this semantics, in the sense that the interpretation of a variable varies only with the
assignment function and not with the possible world. Given a fixed assignment, the interpretation
of a variable is fixed. Thus, ∀x, y(x = y ⇒ x = y) is true in any model and world. Though
variables have assignment-saturated semantic values, they do not have world relative semantic
values. As a consequence, treating names and variables as making semantic contributions of the
same kind poses no obvious challenge to the thesis that names are rigid designators. Of course,
this result is an artifact of two decisions. First, we have chosen not to take modal operators
as variable binding operators. Second, we have chosen not to relativize assignment functions to
worlds as might be suggested by Carnap (1947/1988: §§10, 40).
9Kamp (2002).
10See also Rabern (2012).
11A final approach is employed by dynamic semanticists. They modify the semantic role of sen-
tences so that they function as transitions between sets of assignment functions within a discourse.
The discourse will be regarded as correct provided that there is some assignment function such
that it yields an output when it is entered as an input to the conjunction of the sentences of the
discourse taken in order. Though my sympathies lie with the dynamic view, I will set it aside for
the purposes of this paper. Rather, I will follow Cumming in assuming that context supplies an
assignment function fixing the assignments of the free variables.
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3. Attitudes as Relations to Assignment-Unsaturated Meanings
According to the view that names function as variables, sentences (1) and (2)
are to be regimented as (1a) and (2a), respectively.
(1) Michael believes that Lindsay is charitable.
(1a) BmCxl
(2) Michael believes that Nellie is charitable.
(2a) BmCxn
I assume that the contextually supplied assignment function, σ, assigns both xl and
xn to Lindsay. To avoid complications, I represent the subject of an ascription by
subscripting a closed singular term such as m regimenting ‘Michael’.
The important question is whether this regimentation and the accompanying
new appreciation for the semantic role of a variable can be used to differentiate
the truth conditions of (1) and (2). Millians would argue that no progress has
been made. It follows from their view that (1) and (2) are true just in case (1a)
and (2a) are true an under assignment σ that assigns both xl and xn to Lindsay.
Oversimplifying considerably, one may model an agent’s doxastic state as a set of
worlds compatible with how she takes reality to be.12 A belief ascription such as
BmCxl is true under assignment σ just in case Cxl is true under σ for every world
w in the doxastic state of σ(m). But, Cxl and Cxn determine the same set of
worlds under σ. So, given any assignment function that assigns xl and xn to the
same individual, (1a) and (2a) will be true in the same possible worlds.
The crucial assumption in the Millian’s reasoning is that in assessing whether a
belief ascription, BmCxl, is satisfied by assignment function σ, one must determine
whether the agent stands in a relation to the content of the embedded sentence,
Cxl, under the very same assignment function, σ. However, the dual semantic
features of variables reveal that sometimes we must assess the satisfaction of a
12The semantics constructed above assigns truth conditions to sentences relative to various pa-
rameters such as a world, an assignment function, and a context (though I will suppress the last
of these), rather than assigning structured meanings to a sentence relative to these parameters.
I do so purely for convenience, and everything I say could, with some effort, be translated into a
framework invoking structured meanings. One version of this framework is developed in Soames
(2010: chapter 5).
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whole sentence under an assignment σ in terms of the satisfaction of its components
under a different assignment. In particular, ∃xFx is satisfied by σ just in case the
embedded sentence Fx is true under σ[x/d] for some d ∈ D.
Cumming (2008: 545-6) uses this fact to challenge the crucial assumption. Ac-
cording to Cumming, a belief ascription relates a subject not to a proposition –
modeled as a set of worlds – but to an open proposition, a set of world-assignment
pairs. A belief ascription ‘S believes that Φ’ is true just in case Φ is true in every
world-assignment pair in the agent’s belief box. The doxastic state of an agent x in
a world w is modeled as a set of world-assignment pairs, DOX(x,w). Cumming’s
(2008: 550-1) semantic clause for belief ascriptions – presented with only minor
notational changes – is as follows:
BELIEF: σ,w,M BiΦ if and only if for every< w∗, τ >∈ DOX(||i||σ,w,M , w),
τ,w∗,M Φ
BELIEF allows us to differentiate the satisfaction conditions of (1a) and (2a). (1a)
BmCxl is satisfied by assignment σ just in case every world-assignment pair in
Michael’s belief box makes true Cxl. Similarly, (2a) BmCxn is satisfied by assign-
ment σ just in case every world-assignment pair in Michael’s belief box makes true
Cxn. But there are assignments relative to which the variables xl and xn have
different values. Therefore, it is possible that there is a pair < w, τ > in Michael’s
doxastic state such that xl is assigned to an individual by τ who is in the exten-
sion of C in w, but xn is assigned to an individual who is not in the extension of
C. Thus, Cumming’s view makes it possible that Michael believes that Lindsay is
charitable without believing that Nellie is charitable, even if Lindsay is Nellie.
Of course, this brief characterization leaves open a number of questions, includ-
ing: what does it mean to believe an open proposition? In his informal discussion,
Cumming explains the possibility of believing open proposition in terms of an in-
dividual’s joint attitudes towards the world and towards the salient function that
assigns referents to the terms available in the context. Each world-assignment pair
in an agent’s doxastic state represents a way the world could be that is compatible
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with the agent’s belief set together with an assignment of referents to her terms
compatible with her beliefs.
Though I do not intend to make an issue of this, I am uncomfortable with the
meta-linguistic explanation of the agent’s beliefs. I think it would be better to
understand the fact that variable xl associated with the name ‘Lindsay’ may desig-
nate different individuals relative to different assignment functions as representing
the fact that Lindsay may be each of these individuals, where this ‘may ’ reflects
epistemic possibility. Thus, the fact there is an assignment in Michael’s belief box
that maps xl and xn to different individuals merely reflects the fact that Michael
is unsure of whether Linsday and Nellie are the same person. However, the issues
that I will raise can be separated from the informal understanding of the formal
tools used to model an agent’s belief set.
3.1. A Problem with Quantifying In. On Cumming’s semantics, whether an
attitude ascription such as (1a) BmCxl is satisfied by a sequence σ depends only
on whether for every world-assignment pair < w, τ > in Michael’s belief box, Cxl
is true in world w and assignment τ . The value of the variable xl on the input
assignment, σ, is irrelevant to assessing the satisfaction conditions – and thus the
truth – of the attitude ascription. So whether Michael believes Cxl depends only on
whether he stands in a relation to the assignment-unsaturated satisfaction semantic
value of the open sentence Cxl. It does not depend on who xl is.
In other words, ‘believes’ is a variable binding operator. The Millian held that
the variable xl is free in the sentence (1a) BmCxl. By way of contrast, xl is a
bound variable according to Cumming’s semantics, even though it is not bound by
an explicit quantifier. The variable is bound by the belief operator itself, as are all
free variables in a sentence embedded under a belief ascription.
As a result, a variable within the scope of a belief ascription cannot be not bound
by any quantifiers outside of the scope of the belief ascription. Recall (3a):
(3a) There is an x such that x=Lindsay and Michael believes that x is
charitable.
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After the initial quantifier, ‘there is an x such that’, variable x occurs two more
times in this sentence. In the first occurrence, it is bound by the quantifier ‘there
is’. Thus, the sentence is true just in case there is an assignment function σ that
maps x to Lindsay and σ satisfies ‘Michael believes that x is charitable’. This,
in turn, depends on whether for every < w, τ > in Michael’s belief box, < w, τ >
makes true ‘x is charitable’. The value of x according to σ plays no role in assessing
whether σ satisfies ‘Michael believes that x is charitable’. Suppose, for instance,
that ‘Michael believes that x is charitable’ is true under the contextually supplied
assignment function σ, assigning the variable x to, say, Tobias. It will then also be
true under an assignment function that assigns x to Lindsay. Thus, it will follow
that (3a) is true. This means that (3a) is not a good regimentation of (3) ‘there
is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and that person is
Lindsay’.
A comparison might be helpful. In the sentence (6), the occurrences of x in Fx
and in Gx are bound by different quantifiers.
(6) ∃x(Fx&∃xGx)
According to the standard semantics for first-order logic, (6) is true relative to
assignment σ just in case there is an individual who is F and there is an individual
(not necessarily identical to the first) who is G. It does not require the existence of an
individual who is both F and G. The second occurrence of the existential quantifier
“resets” the assignment function breaking any semantic connection between the
two occurrences of x. Analogously, in (3a) the occurrence of x under the scope of
the belief ascription is bound by a different operator than the occurrences of x that
precede it.
Cumming (2008: 548-9, footnote 48) is admirably clear about this problem. He
considers the sentence ‘every man thinks he is wise’. Regimenting this sentence
using the material provided so far results in the following.
(7) ∀x(Mx⇒ BxWx)
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On Cumming’s semantics, this will be true on an assignment σ just in case every
man believes the same open proposition: that x is wise. In particular, if there is
a single individualx – let’s again say Tobias – such that each many believes that
this individualx is wise, then it will follow on Cumming’s semantics that each manx
believes that hex is wise. There is no coordination between the occurrences of x
outside of the belief ascription and the x occurring within the belief ascription.
Cumming tries to solve this and analogous problems by distinguishing de dicto*
and de re* belief ascriptions. Sentences such as (1a) and (1b) are de dicto* belief
ascriptions insofar as they require Michael to have a belief relating to a specific
open proposition: the proposition that x is charitable. By way of contrast, we want
to be able to say that Michael believes of a specific individual that she is charitable.
Relatedly, we want to be able to say that each man believes of himself that he is
wise, where each man’s belief is true under different conditions (world-assignment
pairs) from the others’ beliefs.
De re* ascriptions are meant to regiment English belief ascriptions that contain
pronouns anaphoric on noun phrases outside of the scope of the ascription, such
as ‘Michael believes of Lindsay that she is charitable’. Cumming understands the
statement that Michael believes of Lindsay that she is charitable as requiring that
Michael believes an open proposition expressed by a sentence of the form ‘α is
charitable’ for some variable α that designates Lindsay. He introduces Greek letters
such as α as metalinguistic variables that range over object-level variables. Very
roughly, the substitutional quantifier ∃αΦ is true if Φ[α/x] is true for some variable
x.13 Cumming regiments a sentence such as ‘Michael believes of Lindsay that she
is charitable’ as follows.
(8) ∃α(α = xl and Michael believes that α is charitable).
This sentence is true on an interpretation σ just in case there is a variable α such
that the interpretation of that variable is co-referential with xl and Michael believes
13Following Cumming, I use Φ[α/x] to designate the result of substituting x for α in Φ.
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the open proposition expressed by ‘α is charitable’. Similarly, ‘every man believes
of himself that he is wise’ is regimented as:
(9) ∀x(Mx⇒ ∃α(α = x&BxWα))
This sentence is true relative to an assignment σ just in case for every x-variant of
σ assigning x to a man, there is a variable α co-referential with x such that the
referent of x believes the open proposition expressed by ‘α is wise’. Cumming (2008:
548-9, footnote 48) points to some problem cases for this strategy, but nonetheless
seems to take his treatment of the core cases to be adequate.14
3.2. The Problem Re-emerges. De re* belief ascriptions only partially specify
the beliefs they ascribe. They assert that an individual believes an open proposi-
tion expressed by an open sentence containing some variable α, but they do not
require the agent to believe the open proposition expressed by a sentence containing
any particular variable. Thus, Cumming’s approach is a version of the analysis of
quantification into attitude constructions developed in Kaplan (1968). This appeal
to quantification over variables in order to capture de re* readings is disappoint-
ing. On any version of the Kaplanian strategy, quantification into attitude contexts
functions differently from quantification in other contexts. At very least, the bound
pronoun inside scope of the attitude ascription must somehow be moved outside
and linked with a new variable that occupies its place within the attitude context.
One might have hoped that the assignment-saturated and assignment-unsaturated
semantic values of variables could adequately resolve the issues concerning quan-
tification into attitude contexts on their own. The addition of quantification over
variables dashes this hope.
But one might think think: at least this mechanism allows him to avoid some
objections to his account. However, I will now argue that it serves to exacerbate
14One might wonder whether Cumming’s regimentation (9) even predicts the correct truth condi-
tions of ‘every man believes that he is wise’. Suppose, once again, that the variable x designates
Tobias on the default assignment and that – as a matter of fact – every man believes that Tobias
(as represented under variable x) is wise. Then it will follow that so long as x designates a man
under assignment function τ , the sentence BxWx will be true. But then, x = x&BxWx will also
be true under τ , as will ∃α(α = x&BxWα). It is a short step from this to (9). Similar arguments
are given in the next section, where I attempt to diagnose the source of the problem.
14 VARIABLES AND ATTITUDES
existing tensions. I have shown that, for Cumming, a belief ascription binds any
free variables in the embedded sentence. Thus, a belief report BtΦ(x) is a closed
sentence (provided that t is closed). Assessing this belief ascription relative to any
two assignment functions delivers the same result. But, if a belief ascription relates
a subject to an open proposition, then the truth-value of the proposition believed
has two parameters: a world and an assignment function. The world is – as usual –
the world in which the agent has the belief. But where does the assignment function
come from?
Cumming seems to propose that the truth-value of the belief ascribed in a context
is determined by the assignment function supplied by the sentential context. This
emerges, in particular, when he suggests that a de re* belief report asserts a relation
between an agent and a “closed proposition”:
[D]e re* belief connects up in a nice way to what I have been calling
“closed” propositions. The truth condition for [‘Biron thinks de re*
that Hesperus is visible’] establishes a relation between Biron and
the coarse-grained, closed proposition that Venus is visible. [‘Biron
thinks de re* that Hesperus is visible’] says that Biron stands in
the belief relation to an open proposition (of a particular form)
whose projection at the contextual assignment is the set of worlds
at which Venus is visible.15
Thus, the assignment function given by the immediate sentential context of a belief
ascription provides the assignment function parameter for assessing the truth of
the belief ascribed by that ascription. As a result, the alethic features of the belief
ascribed – including what the belief is about – depend on the context in which the
belief is ascribed.
So, what an agent believes is fixed for any assignment function, but the truth-
value of the belief depends on which assignment function is operative. There are,
of course, forms of relativism which accept a structure of this sort. But unlike more
benign forms of relativism, Cumming’s view entails that whether an individual
has a given belief is fixed for any input assignment function, while the individuals
believed to be thus-and-so depend on the input assignment function.
15Cumming (2008: 547-8). Emphasis added.
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To see the problem, suppose that Michael believes of an individual that she
is charitable and that his belief is false. That is, assume Michael believes of an
uncharitable individual that she is charitable. This can be regimented by (10).
(10) ∃x(¬Cx&∃α(α = x&BmCα))
(10) requires the existence of an uncharitable individual such that for some variable
y that designates this uncharitable individual, Michael believes the open proposition
expressed by ‘y is charitable’. So in order for (10) to be true under σ, there must
be some de dicto* belief ascription involving y such as (11) that is also true under
σ.
(11) BmCy
Recall that BmCy is closed and is therefore true under any assignment whatsoever,
given that it is true under σ.
Suppose now that there is at least one charitable person in the universe. We can
represent this as:
(12) ∃zCz
I claim that it follows from (11) and (12) that Michael believes of the charitable
individual that she is charitable. One regimentation of this claim is:
(13) ∃y(Cy&∃α(α = y&BmCα))
In particular, I will now argue that this disastrous result is true on any assignment
function whatsoever. (I present a more rigorous version of this argument in the
appendix.)
Let τ be an arbitrary assignment function. (13) is true according to τ just in
case (14) is true for some y-variant of τ .
(14) Cy&∃α(α = y&BmCα)
Because (12) is true, we know that there is some individual d ∈ D who is charitable.
Thus, we know that Cy is true according to τ [y/d].
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But we can also show that ∃α(α = y&BmCα) is true on τ [y/d]. Recall that
BmCy is true on any assignment function whatsoever, including τ [y/d]. The for-
mula y = y is also true on any assignment function whatsoever, including τ [y/d].
Thus, their conjunction y = y&BmCy is true on τ [y/d]. According to Cumming
(2008: 551), ∃α(α = y&BmCα) is true relative to τ [y/d] just in case the result
of replacing α in α = y&BmCα with some variable is true relative to τ [y/d]. But
y = y&BmCy – which I’ve just established to be true relative to τ [y/d] – is the result
of replacing α in α = y&BmCα with y. Thus, it follows that ∃α(α = y&BmCα) is
true relative to τ [y/d]. So, I have established that both Cy and ∃α(α = y&BmCα)
are true under τ [y/d]. We can infer that (14) Cy&∃α(α = y&BmCα) is true under
τ [y/d]. And from this, it follows that (13) is true under arbitrary τ .
This result is utterly disastrous. We have inferred from Michael’s falsely believing
of someone that she is charitable, that he also truly believes of someone that she is
charitable. So just by having a false belief that one individual is charitable, Michael
thereby has the true belief of a different charitable individual that this individual is
charitable. We should not be able to infer that Michael has this very specific true
belief from the fact that he has a false belief that someone is charitable. So, the
account should be rejected.16
Here is another example that shows the extent of the problem. Suppose that
George believes that Lucille is his wife, or BGWxL. I will now show that we can
infer that for every individual identical to, say, Vladimir Putin, George believes of
that individual that he is George’s wife. We know that the sentence BGWxL is
closed, so it is true under every assignment function. But that means it is true
under any assignment function that assigns xL to Putin. From this, we can infer
that for every individual identical to Putin, there is a variable α designating that
individual such that George believes the open proposition expressed by the sentence
‘α is George’s wife’. Thus, ∀xL(xL = xp ⇒ ∃α(α = xL&BGWα)). So, for every
individual identical to Putin, George believes of that individual that he is George’s
16The argument bears some similarities to the “operator arguments” against two-dimensionalism
in Soames (2007), and critically discussed in Dever (2007).
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wife. Needless to say, George does not have any such belief. Thus, the account
should be rejected.
By making belief a relation to an open proposition but leaving the alethic features
of the belief subject to the vicissitudes of the assignment function, the account does
not allow us to assess a belief for correctness in a natural way. Indeed, it makes it
impossible for us to really say what the belief is about, since that too depends on
the shiftable assignment function. This leads me to reject Cumming’s view that the
truth-value of a belief ascription is constant under all assignment functions. The
truth-value of the belief ascribed and the individuals the belief concerns vary with
the assignment function. But this means that the truth-value of a belief ascription
must depend on the assignment-saturated semantic value of its embedded that-
clause in some way.
4. A Comparison
My argument against Cumming closely mirrors Kaplan’s argument against the
corresponding view that belief is a relation to a character. Kaplan (1989) claims
that – like variables – indexicals and demonstratives have two layers of semantic
content: a context-unsaturated semantic value and a context-saturated semantic
value. Consider separate utterances of (15) made by the twins George and Oscar.
(15) I’ve made a huge mistake.
There is a sense in which these two utterances mean the same thing. Each utterance
is true just in case concerning the agent in the context, he has made a huge mistake.
Thus, the two uses of the indexical ‘I’ have a common semantic feature which Kaplan
calls character : in any context, ‘I’ designates the agent of the context.
However, there is a sense in which the two uses of ‘I’ differ in meaning since the
two uses of ‘I’ designate different individuals. Kaplan calls this the content of the
indexical. When George utters (15), his utterance is true just in case George has
made a huge mistake. By way of contrast, when Oscar utters (15), his utterance is
true just in case Oscar has made a huge mistake.
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Of these two semantic features of indexicals – the context-unsaturated character
and the context-saturated content, only the content plays a role in semantic pro-
cessing, according to Kaplan (1989: §8). Specifically, Kaplan argues that there are
no monsters: function terms that operate on the character rather than the content
of an embedded expression. There is no operator such as ‘In some contexts...’ such
that ‘In some contexts I’ve made a huge mistake’ is true just in case there are
contexts in which the agent in those contexts has made a huge mistake.17
One manifestation of – and motivation for – Kaplan’s disbelief in monsters con-
cerns the behavior of indexical expressions under attitude ascriptions. Kaplan found
himself attracted by the view that characters play a role in our cognitive lives. He
(1989: 531) imagines that two twins like George and Oscar each utter a sentence
containing ‘I’ such as (15) ‘I’ve made a huge mistake’. Kaplan suggests that, in
some sense, the twins are in the same cognitive state. For instance, George and
Oscar may feel the same regret at having made a huge mistake or the same anxiety
over the mistake’s consequences.
A theorist tempted by the similarity in their mental states might conclude that
characters – functions from contexts into sets of possible worlds – are the objects
of attitudes. On this view, when George and Oscar think to themselves ‘I’ve made
a huge mistake’, each thought is a relation to the character of this sentence, the
features of this sentence that are independent of context. The twins have thought
the same thing.
This view is precisely analogous to Cumming’s proposal. Just as, for Cumming,
belief is a relation to the assignment-unsaturated semantic value of an open sen-
tence, for the theorist under consideration, belief is a relation context-unsaturated
semantic value of a context sensitive sentence. I showed how Cumming’s view has
the result that the conditions under which an agent has a belief come apart from
whether she stands in any interesting relation to the belief’s alethic features. This
17Discussion in Schlenker (2003), Dever (2004, 2007, Unpublished), and Rabern (2012).
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issued from the fact that the alethic features we ascribe to a belief depend on the
assignment function operative in the context of ascribing it.
Kaplan pointed out that a parallel problem arises for the view that characters are
the objects of belief. Suppose that George has made a huge mistake, but Oscar has
not. Then, when each repeats to himself the sentence ‘I’ve made a huge mistake’,
George has a true belief and Oscar has a false one. But if belief is a relation to a
character, then the two of them believe the same thing, so their beliefs should have
the same truth-value. For this reason, Kaplan proposes that the object of thought
is a content, in this case the content of the utterance of (15). So just as alethic
considerations suggest that we cannot hold that belief is a relation to an assignment-
unsaturated semantic value of an open sentence, analogous considerations suggest
that we cannot hold that belief is a relation to the context-unsaturated semantic
value, character, of a context sensitive sentence.
Kaplan responds to these alethic considerations in the same way in each case. In
the case of variables, he proposes that belief is a relation to the assignment-saturated
semantic value of an open sentence. In the case of indexicals, he proposes that belief
is a relation to the context-saturated value of a sentence, the Kaplanian content.
I will argue that – in the case of variables – this response constitutes a slight
overreaction to the alethic considerations. In particular, the alethic considerations
alone show only that the truth conditions of a belief ascription depend on the
assignment-saturated meaning of the sentence embedded in the that-clause of the
ascription. Absent further argument, they leave open the possibility that the belief
ascription also depends on the assignment-unsaturated meanings of a sentence.18
5. A Two Factor Theory
As we have seen, Cumming treats belief as a relation to an assignment-unsaturated
open sentence meaning, what he calls an open proposition. In contrast, the Millian
construes belief as a relation to an assignment-saturated sentence meaning, which
18One might view two-dimensionalists such as Chalmers (2011) as making the same move in the
case of indexicals.
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I am modeling as a set of worlds. Cumming (2008: 545) suggests that on his treat-
ment belief is a relation to an object “more fine grained than a set of worlds[,]” just
as treating belief as a relation to a structured proposition means that belief relates
an agent to something more fine grained than a set of worlds.
We have seen, however, that this is misleading. An open proposition determines
a set of worlds only relative to an input assignment function. So in making belief
a relation to an open proposition, we lose information about which set of worlds
are compatible with the agent’s belief. That is, the same belief – the belief that
Fx – may be true in one set of worlds relative to assignment function σ and a
different set of worlds relative assignment function τ and yet the truth conditions
of ‘S believes that Fx’ will be the same under σ and τ .
What is wanted is a theory that is sensitive to both the state of the world that the
agent believes to obtain, modeled as a set of worlds, and the peculiar take she has
concerning “who is who” in this state of the world, modeled as an open proposition.
So I propose to do just this. An agent’s doxastic state depends on both the set
of world-assignment pairs compatible with her take on the world, compatible with
who she takes to be who, and also the set of worlds that are actually compatible
with her belief given her circumstances. In other words, the truth conditions of
a belief ascription ‘S believes that Φ’ depend on both the assignment-saturated
meaning of Φ, which is a set of possible worlds, and the assignment-unsaturated
meaning of Φ, which is a set of world-assignment pairs.19
19The view that I develop is intended to make room for the possibility that sentences differing
only by the substitution of co-referential proper names such as ‘Michael believes that Lindsay is
charitable’ and ‘Michael believes that Nellie is charitable’ differ in truth-value. Cumming shares
this goal. But he also wants to solving a puzzle concerning necessarily false propositions arising
from possible-worlds accounts of belief. According to Cumming, the belief ascription ‘Michael
believes that Lindsay is Tobias’ may be true, even though the embedded that-clause is a necessarily
false identity claim. Moreover, this should not entail that Michael believes anything whatsoever.
But if to believe that p requires that the worlds that are epistemically open for an agent include
only p-worlds, then an agent cannot believe a necessarily false proposition without believing
everything. Cumming avoids this problem by denying that one’s epistemic possibilities are given
by a set of worlds, but rather by a set of world-assignment pairs. The fact that Cumming’s view
has this additional flexibility over my own might be seen as an explanatory advantage. However,
Cumming provides only a partial solution to a general problem. His account makes it possible
to believe necessarily false propositions without believing everything, only for certain necessarily
false propositions which can be expressed using proper names. In other cases, the account does not
make room for the possibility that an agent believes other necessarily false propositions without
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5.1. A Naive Regimentation. The satisfaction conditions for belief ascriptions
in our model M =< D,W, I,DOX > must depend both on the input assignment
function and on the alternative assignment functions compatible with who the agent
takes to be whom. The natural semantic characterization of belief ascriptions sat-
isfying these two requirements is as follows.
BELIEF*: σ,w,M BtΦ iff for every < w∗, τ >∈ DOX(||t||σ,w,M , w), both of
the following conditions hold:
(i) τ,w∗,M Φ
(ii) σ,w∗,M Φ
In order for ‘S believes Φ’ to be true relative to assignment function σ, Φ must
be true on every world-assignment pair < w∗, τ > in the agent’s doxastic state
and Φ must also be true on the pair consisting of the world w∗ and the operative
assignment function, σ. Thus, the truth conditions of a belief ascription depend
on both the assignment-unsaturated and the assignment-saturated meanings of the
sentence embedded in its that-clause.
The phenomenon of “quantifying in” can be handled naturally on this account.
Unlike Cumming, I have no need for Kaplan’s analysis. I regiment sentence (3)
‘there is someone such that Michael believes that she is charitable, and that person
is Lindsay’ in the standard way as (3a): ‘there is an x such that x=Lindsay and
Michael believes that x is charitable’. I regiment ‘Michael believes of an uncharita-
ble individual that she is charitable’ as ∃x(¬Cx&BmCx). Similarly, the sentence
‘every man believes that he is wise’, which forced Cumming to introduce de re*
beliefs, can be handled straightforwardly as (7).
(7) ∀x(Mx⇒ BxWx)
(7) is true just in case for every assignment function σ that assigns x to a man, that
man believes of himself (under that variable) that he is wise. We get the desired
coordination of beliefs with believers.
believing every proposition. Thus, if one believes that there is water containing no hydrogen, then
one believes everything. In my view, the problems associated with believing necessary falsehoods
should be solved together, likely by appeal to the semantic structure of the embedded clause. So,
I would dispute that Cumming’s view has a genuine explanatory advantage. Thanks to Brian
Rabern and Seth Yalcin for discussion.
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Thus, one advantage of the account is that it delivers a straightforward treat-
ment of quantification into attitude ascriptions without relying on quantification
over senses, discourse referents, or variables as in other accounts which respect the
Fregean data. Aside from an argument that I will reject in the next section, we
simply have no need for the device introduced by Kaplan (1968). Everything is
done with the independently motivated dual semantic roles of variables.
The problematic step in the argument against Cumming was that if BmCx is
true on one assignment, then it is true on every assignment function. But this is not
true on the semantics I am suggesting. BmCx is what we might call a quasi-open
sentence. Its truth-value relative to an assignment σ depends in part on the value
of x relative to σ. Thus, if τ assigns x to a different individual than σ, the sentence
BmCx may be true for σ but not for τ . I call the sentence quasi-open, because it
does not allow the free substitution salva veritate of one variable for another. To
put the view in a slogan: belief is a relation between an agent and a quasi -open
proposition.
5.2. Quantifying In, Again. One consequence of any account on which ‘believes’
operates on open propositions – even if it also operates on closed propositions –
is that certain familiar variable interchange theorems will fail. In particular, the
following theorem will fail:
(16)  ∀x(BtΦ(x)→ ∀y(y = x→ BtΦ(y))).
That is, just because one believes of, say, Lindsay that she is charitable, it doesn’t
follow that one believes of everyone who happens to be identical to Lindsay that
she’s charitable.
To see that the inference is invalid suppose that assignment σ makes true BtΦ(x)
and that x and y co-refer on σ. In order for (16) to be a theorem, it must follow
that σ makes true BtΦ(y). Does this follow? No, because whether BtΦ(y) is
true on assignment σ depends not just on the value of x relative to σ, but also
on whether every world-assignment pair in the agent’s belief set makes true Φ(y).
The assignments in her belief set may assign different individuals to x and y, even
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though x and y co-refer on the input assignment. So we may not infer that σ makes
true Φ(y). Thus, (16) is not a theorem.
These considerations have consequences for the validity of natural language ar-
guments containing sentences in which a pronoun within the scope of an attitude
verb is anaphorically dependent on a quantifier outside with wider scope than the
verb. Consider the following argument.
(17) Michael believes of his sister that she is charitable.
(18) The woman at the counter is Michael’s sister.
(19) Therefore, Michael believes of the woman at the counter that she is
charitable.
Millians might suggest that this argument is straightforwardly valid. But on my ac-
count, the validity of this argument depends on how it is regimented. The following
regimentation is valid. (Treating ‘his sister’ as a quantifier.)
(17a) Michael believes of his sisterx that shex is charitable.
(18a) The woman at the counter is Michael’s sister.
(19a) Therefore, Michael believes of the womanx at the counter that shex is
charitable.
But the following alternative regimentation is not valid.
(17b) Michael believes of his sisterx that shex is charitable.
(18b) The woman at the counter is Michael’s sister.
(19b) Therefore, Michael believes of the womany at the counter that shey is
charitable.
This argument is not valid because in order for (19b) to be true, Michael must
believe of the woman at the counter that she is charitable under the mode of
presentation associated with y.
The case of ‘every man believes that he is wise’ showed that Cumming’s account
cannot straightforwardly handle quantification into belief contexts. For that reason,
he introduced the notion of belief de re*. As we saw, Cumming regiments this
sentence as ∀x(Mx ⇒ ∃α(α = x&BxWα)). Cumming would therefore offer the
following regimentation of the above argument.
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(17c) Michael’s sisterx is such that for some variable α designating herx,
pMichael believes that α is charitableq is true.
(18c) The woman at the counter is Michael’s sister.
(19c) Therefore, the womany at the counter is such that for some variable α
designating hery, pMichael believes that α is charitableq is true.20
This alternative regimentation puts the variables x and y outside of the scope of
the belief ascription. Because of this, all occurrences of the variable x in de re*
belief ascription can be substituted salva veritate for a distinct variable y, if y does
not already occur in the ascription. Thus, Cumming’s de re* ascriptions allow
substitution of distinct variables assigned to the same individual.
I have tried to do without the Kaplanian mechanism for quantifying in. As
we have seen, my suggestion allows for distributive attributions of belief without
complications. I do not endorse Cumming’s use of de re* propositions even for
cases in which a belief ascription contains a pronoun anaphorically dependent on a
quantifier phrase. Thus, I have made no provision for the substitution of distinct
anaphoric pronouns under the scope of belief ascriptions, even if these pronouns
are satisfied by the same individual. On my view, this is as it should be, if we
want to respect the Fregean data. If one takes Frege’s puzzle cases seriously for
proper names, then one should also take them seriously in cases of quantifying in.
Consider (20).
(20) Looking at the girl soliciting for charity, Michael doesn’t for a moment
believe that she’s lazy. In fact, the girl is his niece, Maeby. And if there’s
one thing that he believes concerning his niece, it’s that she’s lazy.
This string of sentences strikes me as consistent. The sentences seem no more
problematic than any other Frege’s puzzle case. I suggest that the consistency of
this report be accounted for by a distinction in the variables used to quantify into
the belief reports as follows.
20Recall that the quantification over variables was understood substitutionally. I have instead
used explicit metalinguistic discourse and replaced the identities with designation relations in
order to smooth over discussion.
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(20a) Looking at the girlx soliciting for charity Michael doesn’t for a moment
believe that shex is lazy. In fact, the girl is his niece, Maeby. And if there’s
one thing that he believes concerning his niecey, it’s that shey is lazy.
If we introduce a new variable y – even if this variable tracks the same individual
in the local sentential context – there is no guarantee that the variable tracks the
individual in the same way. The truth conditions of a belief ascription depend not
only on what is required of the world for her belief to be true, but also on her
subjective take on this requirement. Thus, we cannot infer from the fact that two
variables are co-referential on assignment σ, that belief ascriptions which differ only
be the substitution of one variable for the other are equivalent under σ.21
Indeed, there are a host of similar examples suggesting that Frege’s cases are just
as puzzling when names are replaced by bound variables. Many of these cases are
similar to the hooded man examples discussed in Priest (2002). Consider another
example:
(21) After glancing at a man in the jail cell, Michael thought that he deserved
that punishment. On the other hand, Michael never thought of any of his
uncles that they deserved that punishment. In fact, the man in the cell
was an uncle, Oscar.
(21a) After glancing at a manx in the jail cell, Michael thought that hex
deserved that punishment. On the other hand, Michael never thought of
anyy of his uncles that theyy deserved that punishment. In fact, the only
man in the cell was Michael’s uncle, Oscar
(21) seems to be a consistent way of assigning beliefs to Michael. That is, just like
any other case, it doesn’t seem inconsistent upon first reading. Those who want
to do justice to Fregean intuitions generally would do well to offer a consistent
interpretation. The most plausible strategy, once again, that distinct, but co-
referential variables cannot be substituted salva veritate in attitude ascriptions. As
regimented by (21a), the first sentence requires Michael to believe the proposition
that Oscar – on the mode associated with x – deserves that punishment. The
21If one is suspicious of my use of definite descriptions, consider a case containing less controversial
quantifier phrases: Looking at each manx soliciting for charity, Michael doesn’t for a moment
believe that hex is lazy. In fact, though, each man soliciting for charity is one of Michael’s
brothers. And if there’s one thing that he believes concerning eachy of his brothers, it’s that hey
is lazy.
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second sentence requires that he fail to believe of each of his uncles (including
Oscar) that he – under the mode of presentation associated with y – deserves that
punishment. For this reason, the regimentation correctly predicts that the discourse
has a consistent reading.
I should mention that it’s hardly a new thought that in natural language belief
reports, one cannot substitute salva veritate one anaphoric pronoun for another,
even if the two anaphoric pronouns designate the same individuals relative to the
contextually supplied assignment function. One example arises in the context of
Kit Fine’s semantic relationism, which blocks the substitution of distinct variables
salva veritate in belief ascriptions (2009: 115-117), even if these variables have
value-ranges including the same single individual. Fine’s position is only briefly
sketched and is developed outside to the Tarskian framework. Nonetheless, he
endorses substitution failures related to those that I am considering.
DRT accounts of attitude ascriptions also fail to validate the substitution of
pronouns anaphoric on different quantifier phrases within the context of belief as-
criptions, even if the pronouns are assigned to the same individual on the relevant
assignments. According to Asher (1993: §5.1), a belief ascription in natural lan-
guage containing a pronoun anaphoric on an external quantifier is modeled using
two variables. One variable is indeed bound by the quantifier and contributes its
value on the relevant assignment function. This variable, which Asher says provides
the external anchor, grounds the alethic features of the belief ascribed. The other
variable is potentially co-indexed with other variables in the agent’s belief set. It
ranges over internal representations the agent might have. Asher says that this sec-
ond variable provides an internal anchor. Thus, Asher’s strategy looks like a variant
of Kaplan’s mechanism for quantifying in. But using the resources of DRT allows
Asher (1993: §2.8) to block the argument from (17) and (18) to (19), as I think is
appropriate. Moreover, the appeal to the distinction between internal and external
anchors is independently motivated within the DRT framework.22 However, the
22Asher (1993: §2.8).
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off-the-shelf nature of the approach does not necessarily carry over outside of this
framework. For this reason, I have emphasized my development which achieves a
similar effect solely in terms of the semantic values of a single variable.
5.3. Equivalent Variables. One might object to my proposal on the grounds
that for any syntactically distinct variables, there is some assignment function that
distinguishes them. This means that belief ascriptions containing distinct free vari-
ables in their embedded clauses are never equivalent, even when used in the null
context. I concede that this result would be problematic.
However, the result is an artifact of the use of assignment functions rather than
an alternative semantic treatment of variables. Specifically, I would prefer a seman-
tics, modeled on Tarski’s own proposal, that assigns each variable in a context to a
position in a sequence.23 A sentence will then be true or false relative to a sequence
s which assigns to every variable v the object in the contextually determined v
position of the sequence. As the conversation progresses, different variables will be
assigned to different positions in sequences. This doesn’t foreclose the possibility
that two variables are merely linguistically different from each other, but are se-
mantically the same, since they are assigned to the same position of a sequence. I
believe that such an account is independently motivated to resist recent arguments
against the Tarskian semantics for variables in Fine (2009: 9-11).24 On my account
as long as uses of variables are “coordinated” so as to pick out the same position in
sequences, attitude ascriptions involving these variables will be interchangeable.25
Finally, I would like to leave open the possibility of a more Carnapian treatment
of quantification according to which a quantification varies not only the object
assigned to the variable by the sequence, but also the position in the sequence
23Tarski (1983a: 190-191, including footnote 1).
24See Dever (Unpublished) for a related view.
25For example, Tarski toys with the idea that the nth variable in a sentence is assigned to the nth
position in the sequence. Thus, the nth variable in any two sentences will always have the same
interpretation. The function from contexts to variables needn’t be so crude, however.
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associated with the variable. Such a view would still invalidate (16), but would
validate some other variable interchange theorems.26
6. Summing Up
I endorse the view that if Michael believes of Lindsay that she is charitable, he
need not believe of someone who happens to be identical to Lindsay that she is
charitable. If I am right, then I have accounted for the phenomena of quantifying
in without appeal to any variant of the machinery of Kaplan (1968). I take this
to be a great strength of my modification over Cumming’s original account. If
my view about the substitution of variables should prove to be untenable, then I
could appeal to the same version of this machinery that Cumming introduces. My
modification would still be required to block the argument from (11) and (12) to
(13), which his account fails to do.
I have explored responses to the Millian argument from quantifying into attitude
constructions which preserve the Fregean view that sentences differing only by the
substitution of co-referential proper names may differ in truth-value. I have argued
that Cumming’s view that belief is a relation to an open proposition fails to achieve
this goal, since it unmoors the conditions under which an agent has a belief from
the alethic features of that belief. In its place, I have proposed an account on which
the truth conditions of a belief ascription depend on both the assignment-saturated
and the assignment-unsaturated meaning of an open sentence. As I have said,
belief is a relation to a quasi-open proposition. This view offers a more elegant
response because it accounts for the phenomenon of quantification into attitude
constructions wholly in terms of the “off the shelf” semantics of variables, making
no appeal to Kaplan’s treatment of quantifying in.
26The difference between the two approaches is that – as stated – my approach differentiates
variables in different sentences syntactically bound by different quantifiers. The Carnapian
(1947/1988: §43) approach – at the level of modal operators – only holds intrasententially, as
in ∃x∃y(x = y&¬(x = y)). I want to leave open the possibility that a correlate of this result
holds at the level of attitude ascriptions as in (16), but does not extend to variables occurring in
different sentences was in the argument (17)-(19) above. On the more Carnapian semantics, this
argument would be valid, but an intrasentential version of this argument would be invalid.
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Throughout, I have taken the Fregean judgments about substitution of co-
referential proper names at face value. I still take it to be an open and significant
challenge for the anti-Millian to show that these judgments are robust enough to
be incorporated into a semantic theory. I must admit that the arguments in Kripke
(1979) and Salmon (1986) give me pause. However, if the judgments are to be
taken seriously as a basis for semantic theory, then I think that the position I have
developed will be a component of the full story.27
Appendix
In this appendix, I give a more explicit derivation of the result presented in §3.2.
Suppose (A) and (B):
A: σ,w,M ∃xCx and
B: σ,w,M BCy.
I will use these to derive the disastrous conclusion, that for any assignment function
τ :
C: τ,w,M ∃y(Cy&∃α(α = y&BCα)).
In order to derive this result, I assume the semantic clauses for substitutional
and objectual quantification which I transcribe directly into my symbolism from
Cumming (2008: 551) as well as the usual semantic clauses given in §2.
Substitutional Quantification: γ,w,M ∃αΦ(α) if and only if γ,w,M Φ(α)[α/x]
is true for some x ∈ V ar, where V ar is the set of variables.
Objectual Quantification: γ,w,M ∃xΦ(x) if and only if ∃d ∈ D and γ[x/d],w,M
Φ(x)
From (A), it follows that for some d ∈ D
27This work received helpful comments from audiences at St Andrews, The University of Lisbon,
The Italian Society for Analytic Philosophy, and the University of Barcelona. I have also benefited
from discussion with Derek Ball, Adrian Briciu, Sam Cumming, Josh Dever, Manuel Garc´ıa-
Carpintero, Max Ko¨lbel, Genoveva Mart´ı, David Rey, Jason Stanley, and Seth Yalcin. Particular
thanks are due to Ray Buchanan, Dilip Ninan, Brian Rabern, Stephan Torre, and an anonymous
referee at Nouˆs. The research leading to these results benefited from partial funds from projects
CSD2009–00056 and FFI2012-37658 (Spanish Government) and from the LOGOS Research Group
2009SGR-1077 (Catalan Government).
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D: d ∈ ||C||M .
Let τ∗ = τ [y/d]. It is then sufficient for (C) to show that:
E: τ∗,w,M (Cy&∃α(α = y&BCα)).
From (D), we get:
F: τ∗,w,M Cy.
Recall that (B) is a closed sentence. Therefore, if it is true under assignment σ it
is also true under assignment τ∗:
G: τ∗,w,M BCy
It trivially follows that:
H: τ∗,w,M y = y&BCy
By the semantic clause for Substitutional Quantification, we have:
I: If τ∗,w,M (α = y&BCα)[α/y], then τ∗,w,M ∃α(α = y&BCα).
Claim: (α = y&BCα)[α/y] = (y = y&BCy).
Thus by Claim and (I), we get:
J: τ∗,w,M ∃α(α = y&BCα).
By (F) and (J) we get immediately to the desired (E):
E: τ∗,w,M (Cy&∃α(α = y&BCα)).
Since τ∗ = τ [y/d] and d ∈ D, (C) follows immediately.
C: τ,w,M ∃y(Cy&∃α(α = y&BCα)).
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